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STUDENT COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ABROGATION OF STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER CERCLA
[Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989)]
INTRODUCTION
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., Ithe United States Supreme Court
held that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund), as amended
by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA),2 permits a private party to sue a state for damages in federal
court.
3
This case is significant because the eleventh amendment4 to the
United States Constitution has been construed to grant a state sover-
eign immunity5 from suit by its own citizens in federal court.6 Sover-
eign immunity has barred such a suit even though the amendment's
restriction of judicial power does not explicitly disallow it.7
1. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
2. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Star. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
3. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2286.
4. The eleventh amendment states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
5. The doctrine of sovereign immunity dates back to France in the 1500s. See
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an
Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition of Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV.
1033, 1064 (1983).
Sovereign immunity is based on the premise that the King can do no wrong.
"'The law... ascribes to the King the attribute of sovereignty: he is sovereign and
independent within his own dominions; and [he] owes no kind of objection to any
other potentate upon earth.'" Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 458 (1793)
(quoting Sir William Blackstone) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
6. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
7. In Hans, a citizen of Louisiana sued the state for damages when the state
failed to pay a debt owed on a bond held by Hans. Id. at 21. Hans alleged that the
state's refusal to pay violated the state's constitution, which had a contracts clause
ensuring payment on the bond obligation. The Court held that neither article III of
the Constitution, nor the Judiciary Act of 1875 giving effect to federal question juris-
diction under article III, allowed Hans to sue Louisiana. The Court reached this
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The Union Gas Court used a two-part test to determine whether
Congress had overridden state sovereign immunity.8 First, the
Court applied a statutory construction analysis to determine whether
Congress intended to override states' immunity.9 Second, the Court
looked at whether abrogation of immunity by Congress was constitu-
tionally permissible.10 Abrogation was permissible only when Con-
gress has constitutional authority to create a cause of action in
federal court, and the state has consented to jurisdiction.ll
In Union Gas, the Court held that the language of CERCLA
demonstrated an intent to hold states liable for damages in federal
court.1 2 Despite precedent holding that congressional intent to
override immunity must be "unmistakably clear,"ts the Court found
clear intent by collectively analyzing four different sections of the
statute. 14
The Court then held that the commerce clause granted Congress
the power to enact CERCLA and create a cause of action in federal
court that would supersede state sovereign immunity.15 Finally, the
conclusion in spite of the fact that the eleventh amendment did not expressly pro-
hibit such a suit. Id. at 21.
With Hans, the Court established "judicial sovereign immunity," which may only
be abrogated where the state has consented to the suit. Id. at 16. This immunity is
not grounded in the language of the Constitution, but is lifted from a long history of
sovereign immunity in the common law and engrafted upon the eleventh amend-
ment. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2286 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Tribe, Inter-
governmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in
Controversies About Federalism, 89 HA.v. L. REv. 682, 684 (1976) (the focus in eleventh
amendment cases is not on the eleventh amendment but on the concept of immunity,
a concept of which the amendment is but a reminder and exemplification).
8. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2276.
9. Id. at 2277.
10. Id. at 2281.
11. Id. at 2284.
12. Id. at 2280.
13. Although the rule has fluctuated over time, the prevailing test is announced
in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). In Atascadero, the
Court stated that "Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immu-
nity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute." Id. at 242.
14. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2277-80.
15. Id. at 2285. The Court cites six Supreme Court cases, none of which have
holdings based on the premise for which the Court cites them. The issue of Con-
gress' commerce clause power was only mentioned in the dictum of these cases. See
Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 475 (1987) (plural-
ity held that injured seamen could not sue state because Jones Act had no express
language showing intent to allow suit); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation,
470 U.S. 226, 252 (state did not waive constitutional immunity on issue of indemnity)
(1985); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 74 (1985) (suit which had become moot
under congressional amendment of AFDC program could not proceed against the
state under the Declaratory Judgment Act); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 349
(1979) (notice to plaintiff class about state administrative remedies for recovering
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Court declared that states consented to jurisdiction under CERCLA
when they ratified the Constitution containing the commerce
clause. 16
The Union Gas decision did little to clarify eleventh amendment
jurisprudence.t7 However, the Court applied sound reasoning,
based on strong policy arguments, to arrive at the right conclusion.
CERCLA has been broadly construed to impose liability on private
parties, federal and local governments, so states should not escape
liability when they are responsible for environmental harm.
I. CERCLA
Congress enacted CERCLA to provide the federal government
with authority to clean up old hazardous waste sites.18 CERCLA was
a controversial statute,' 9 passed by a lame duck Congress in re-
sponse to the tragic discovery of an abandoned waste dump at Love
Canal, New York, and "the discovery of the Valley of Drums in Ken-
welfare benefits permissible because no liability against the state was created); Em-
ployees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279, 287 (1973) (sovereign immunity barred suit by employee against state hos-
pital under Fair Labor Standards Act); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 196
(1964) (state's operation of railroad constituted implied waiver of sovereign immu-
nity), overnuled in part, Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468 (1987) (plurality decision).
16. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2284.
17. Justice Scalia criticizes the majority for adding to the clutter, rather than
clearing up "the allegedly muddled eleventh amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 2303
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Tribe, supra note 7, at 688 (describing the Court's ap-
proach to the eleventh amendment as "schizophrenic").
18. See Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability ("Superfiind") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 1, 2 (1982);
Strohbehn, The Bases for Federal/State Relationships in Environmental Law, 12 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 15074, 15083 (1982).
CERCLA "is designed to clean up releases of hazardous substances rather than
to regulate the use of products, the emission or discharge of substances, or the dispo-
sal of wastes." Strohbehn, supra, at 15083. Regulation of the hazardous waste indus-
try is covered by the Solid Waste Disposal Act, commonly known as "RCRA." See 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). RCRA is preventative whereas CER-
CLA is remedial. See Note, Superfund and California's Implementation: Potential Conflict, 19
CAL. W.L. REV. 373, 376 & n.23 (1983).
19. For an extensive discussion of the legislative history of CERCLA, see Grad,
supra note 18. The bill which became CERCLA was the product of a last minute
compromise, drafted by a group of senators, and was not extensively considered by
either house of Congress. During Senate consideration of the compromise bill, Sen-
ator Baker explained: "This compromise is a fragile thing.... [It was the subject of
extensive negotiations.... and it deals with a very difficult subject." 126 CONG. REC.
30,916 (1980); cf. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100,
1111 (D. Minn. 1982) (Senate made last minute amendments removing provisions
imposing liability for personal injury); Strohbehn, supra note 18, at 15083 (provisions
for personal injury joint and several liability removed).
1990]
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tucky."20 The pressure under which the statute was created and en-
acted resulted in a fragmented legislative history and a law that lacks
clarity.21
Section 111 of the SARA amendments established a fund of 8.5
billion dollars to be used for government cleanup actions. 22 Section
105 is entitled the National Contingency Plan (NCP), and requires
the President to establish procedures and standards for responding
to releases of hazardous substances.23 Section 115 delegates pri-
mary responsibility for administration of CERCLA to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA).24
Under CERCLA, the EPA has three main alternatives for ensuring
20. Strohbehn, supra note 18, at 15083; see also Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are
There Any Defenses Left?, 12 HAuv. ENVTL. L. REV. 385, 389 (1989). CERCLA was
passed by Congress on December 11, 1980, following incumbent Jimmy Carter's de-
feat in the presidential election by Ronald Reagan. See Grad, supra note 18, at 35.
In the SARA amendments, Congress enacted a specific provision just for the
acquisition of the Love Canal property. See 42 U.S.C. § 9661 (Supp. V 1987).
21. See Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568,
1572 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[I]t was enacted in the waning hours of the 96th Congress,
and as the product of apparent legislative compromise is not a model of clarity.");
United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 1984) ("stat-
ute was hastily and inadequately drafted"); United States v. Stringfellow, 14 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envd. L. Inst.) 20385, 20386 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1984) ("[T]he language of
CERCLA . .. bears the earmarks of hasty drafting and last-minute political compro-
mise, and ... its legislative history.. . [is] 'riddled by self-serving and contradictory
statements.' ") (citation omitted); cf. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong
World Indus., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1293 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (stating that "it is debat-
able whether any provision of CERCLA is 'clear' ").
As one commentator has pointed out with respect to the legislative history of
CERCLA:
The legislative history of a statute is always important in gathering the legis-
lative intent for its implementation. In the instance of the "Superfund" leg-
islation, a hastily assembled bill and a fragmented legislative history add to
the usual difficulty of discerning the full meaning of the law. The legislation
that did pass, with all of its inadequacies, was the best that could be done at
the time.
Grad, supra note 18, at 2. Another commentator concludes that, as a result of the
inadequate drafting, courts are left to develop the standards of liability under CER-
CLA. See Giblin, Judicial Development of Standards of Liability in Government Enforcement
Actions Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 33
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984-85).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (Supp. V 1987). The five year, 8.5 billion dollar fund
appropriation replaces the expired 1.6 billion dollar fund established under
CERCLA.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (Supp. V 1987). The corresponding regulations to imple-
ment the plan appear at 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.86 (1989). These regulations set guide-
lines and methods for responding to hazardous waste problems.
Section 105 also requires the President to develop a ranking of priority sites for
response and remedial action entitled the National Priorities List (NPL). 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605(c). NPL is codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300, app. B (1989).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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cleanup of hazardous waste dumps. First, the EPA can bring a re-
sponse action under section 104 and use superfund money to clean
up the site.25 Second, the EPA may bring an abatement action under
section 106 when it is determined "that there may be an imminent
and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the
environment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazard-
ous substance from a facility."26 Section 106 enforcement actions do
not require state cooperation and allow the government to force
clean up of sites without expending federal Superfund monies.27 Fi-
nally, under section 122, the EPA can enter into a settlement agree-
ment with the responsible parties in which the responsible parties
agree to fund and undertake the clean up action.28
A section 104 response action is authorized whenever there is a
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant into the environment which presents an imminent and
substantial danger to the public health or welfare.29 The response
action is designed to remove, or arrange for removal, of the hazard-
ous substance.30 The federal government cannot bring a response
action unless the state in which the release occurs enters into an
agreement with the EPA.31 Under section 104, the state must con-
tract to: (1) assure all future maintenance of the removal and reme-
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Response measures using
Superfund monies must be consistent with the NCP. Id. § 9604(a)(1)(B).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982). The district court in the district where the threat
occurs has jurisdiction to grant equitable relief as required to protect the public in-
terest. Id. Only the federal government, and not a state, may seek injunctive relief
under section 106. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1049-50 (2d
Cir. 1985).
27. See Reed, CERCLA Litigation Update: The Emerging Law of Generator Liability, 14
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10224, 10235 (1984) ("Every national priorities list
(NPL) site EPA can compel potentially responsible parties to clean up under § 106 is
one that will not require expenditure of Superfund monies.").
The legislative history of SARA reveals a preference for allowing private parties
to conduct cleanup in lieu of using fund monies. H.R. REP. No. 253 (I), 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 58, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2849.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (Supp. V 1987).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987). Under the SARA amendments, the
EPA may allow the owner or operator of the vessel or facility, or any other responsi-
ble party, to fund and carry out the response action. Id. In the legislative history of
SARA, the report of the House Energy and Commerce Committee states that the
administrator should use private monies whenever possible to conduct actions under
section 104. See H.R. REP. No. 253 (I), supra note 27, at 2837. "Congress must facili-
tate cleanups of hazardous substances by the responsible parties while assuring a
strong EPA oversight role .... " Id.
30. H.R. REP. No. 253 (I), supra note 27, at 2837. Long range remedial action is
limited by section 2, subdivision 1 of section 104. Remedial actions are cut off at 12
months or 2 million dollars, whichever comes first, regardless of the state of the envi-
ronment. Id. at 2839.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (Supp. V 1987).
1990) 1079
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dial actions; (2) assure the availability of an acceptable hazardous
waste disposal facility; and (3) assure payment of or pay ten percent
of the costs of the remedial action.3 2
When the federal government brings a response action, it may sue
any potentially responsible parties (PRPs) under section 107 to re-
cover response costs and damages to replenish the Superfund.33 Li-
ability is triggered when there is a release,3 4 or a threatened
release,35 of a hazardous substance from a facilityS6 causing response
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (Supp. V 1987). Responsibility for costs of the reme-
dial action may rise to 50 percent of any sums expended if the action is in response to
a release from a state owned or operated facility. Id. § 9604(c)(3)(C)(ii).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1987). Section 107 authorizes recovery of re-
moval and remedial costs. Removal actions are designed to protect against immedi-
ate dangers imposed by the hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (Supp. V
1987). Remedial actions are intended to provide a permanent remedy to hazardous
contamination. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). Only costs "not inconsistent" with the NCP
are recoverable by the federal government or a state. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)
(Supp. V 1987). Private party response costs must be "consistent" with the NCP to
be recoverable. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
Defendants have the burden of proving that government response costs are "not
inconsistent" with the NCP. United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal,
Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 1009 (D.S.C. 1984) (reasonableness of government costs is
presumed to have been built into plan), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156
(1989). Costs have included litigation and attorneys' fees, and the administrative and
investigative costs associated with cleanups. Id. Besides costs, section 107 also au-
thorizes recovery of damages from.PRPs. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), (c)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
Citizens may bring a civil action to enforce the standards imposed under CER-
CLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (Supp. V 1987). The citizen suit provision is limited to
equitable remedies and does not provide a means for recovering response costs or
damages. See id.
34. The term "release" is defined in the statute to include:
any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, in-
jecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (in-
cluding the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other
closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or con-
taminant), but excludes (A) any release which results in exposure to persons
solely within a workplace, with respect to a claim which such persons may
assert against the employer of such persons, (B) emissions from the engine
exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pump-
ing station engine, (C) release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear mate-
rial from a nuclear incident . . . and (D) the normal application of fertilizer.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (Supp. V 1987).
35. The term "threatened release" is not defined by the statute.
36. The term "facility" is defined in the statute to include:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (includ-
ing any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit,
pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehi-
cle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous sub-
stance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise
come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in con-
sumer use or any vessel.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (Supp. V 1987).
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costs to be incurred.S7 Under section 107, there are four categories
of PRPs including: (1) the current owner or operator of the site;38 (2)
any previous owner or operator who owned or operated the site at
the time hazardous substances were disposed of;S9 (3) any owner or
possessor of hazardous substances who arranged for disposal or
treatment of such substances at the site;40 and (4) any person who
transported hazardous substances to the site.4 t
CERCLA is silent on the nature of liability imposed under section
107. In United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.,42 the first court to address
the issue held defendants, as the generators and transporters, sub-
ject to joint and several liability.43 The majority of courts have fol-
lowed, imposing joint and several liability where the harm caused is
indivisible.44
CERCLA has also been interpreted to impose strict liability with-
out regard to fault or willfulness. In United States v. Price,45 the court
held that Congress intended to impose strict liability, subject only to
the affirmative defenses in section 107(b).46 The Price court was con-
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (Supp. V 1987).
38. Id. § 9607(a)(1).
39. Id. § 9607(a)(2).
40. Id. § 9607(a)(3).
41. Id. § 9607(a)(4).
42. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
43. Id. at 810. After determining that CERCLA required the development of a
uniform federal common law, the court addressed the liability issue. Although Con-
gress deleted references to strict, joint, and several liability from the final bill (in
order to avoid universal application to inappropriate circumstances), the court
looked to the legislative history to determine that common law principles should ap-
ply. Relying on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1979), the court stated
that when two or more persons cause a single, indivisible harm, each is subject to
liability for the entire harm. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810.
44. See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F.
Supp. 984, 994-95 (D.S.C. 1984) (joint and several liability is appropriate under
CERCLA in circumstances of divisible injury), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom.
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3156 (1989); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (follow-
ing Chem-Dyne decision imposing joint and several liability unless defendants can es-
tablish a reasonable basis for apportionment of the harm between them).
In United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984), how-
ever, the court stated that a rigid application ofjoint and several liability is "inappro-
priate" because "joint and several liability is extremely harsh and unfair if it is
imposed on a defendant who contributed only a small amount of waste to a site." Id.
at 1256; see also United States v. Stringfellow, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20385,
20387 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1984) (supporting A & F Materials and the adoption of a
flexible approach to the apportionment of liability when two or more persons cause a
single or distinct harm, as opposed to a single indivisible harm).
45. 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983).
46. Id. at 1113-14. The three affirmative defenses listed in section 107(b) in-
clude: (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or omission by a third party. To
claim the third party defense requires that there be no contractual relationship be-
1990] 1081
7
Goldberg: Constitutional Law—Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity under C
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
cerned that a less stringent standard would not be in conjunction
with "the legislative aims of CERCIA which include goals such as
cost-spreading and assurance that responsible parties bear their cost
of the clean up."4 7 The legislative history of the SARA amendments
confirms that Congress intended a strict, joint and several liability
standard.48
The section 107 liability provision is sweeping and has been inter-
preted broadly to include remote parties with little or no connection
to the resulting environmental harm.49 In New York v. Shore Realty
Corp. ,50 the court held that under section 107(a)(1), current owners
or operators are liable regardless of whether they caused or contrib-
uted to the release or threatened release.5t In another case, current
owners or operators were held to include a lender who foreclosed on
a mortgage held on a garbage dump which had been declared a haz-
ardous waste facility.52
tween the third party and the defendant, or that the defendant exercised due care,
taking precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions by the third party. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b) (1982).
47. Price, 577 F. Supp. at 1114; see also Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles.
Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988) (imposing strict liability on cur-
rent owners of facility which releases or threatens to release a hazardous substance);
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044-45 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding
defendants strictly liable, without causation, to avoid opening a loophole in CER-
CLA's coverage).
48. H.R. REP. No. 99-253 (I), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 58, 74, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2835, 2856 (1986). "[L]iability under CERCLA is strict
.... The committee fully subscribes to the reasoning of the court in the seminal case
of United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983), which estab-
lished a uniform federal rule allowing for joint and several liability in appropriate
CERCLA cases." Id. (citation omitted).
49. One commentator calls this deep pocket approach to liability grossly unfair,
leaving few defenses to the imposition of liability. See Glass, supra note 20, at 396.
Another commentator recommends abolishing section 107 liability altogether. See
Lyons, Deep Pockets and CERCLA: Should Superfund Liability Be Abolished?, 6 STAN. ENVTL.
LJ. 271 (1986-87).
50. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
51. Id. at 1044. To require causation would open "a huge loophole" in CER-
CLA's coverage since new purchasers of hazardous waste facilities who did not cause
the dumping would not be liable. Id. at 1045. This result would frustrate the goals of
the statute since those who actually caused the harm are frequently impossible to
find. Id.
52. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md.
1986). The court rejected Maryland Bank & Trust's argument that section
101(20)(A) applied to exempt it from liability. Id. at 579. Section 101(20)(A) ex-
empts from liability those who hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect a secur-
ity interest in the facility. Id. The court in Maryland Bank determined that the
security interest must exist at the time of the cleanup, and the company had full title,
not a security interest, a full year before the EPA cleanup. Id.; cf. United States v.
Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992, 20994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985)
[Vol. 161082
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In Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc. ,5s a real estate
developer who built on top of creosote pools left by the previous
owner was held liable as a previous owner under section 107(a)(2).54
Relying on an expansive interpretation of "disposal," the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that movement and dispersement of the land by the devel-
oper constituted a "disposal."5 5 In United States v. Monsanto Co. ,56 the
Fourth Circuit held that two individuals who previously owned the
site, but leased it to others who did the dumping, were liable. The
court stated that "the statute does not sanction such willful or negli-
gent blindness on the part of absentee owners."
5 7
In United States v. Wade,58 a federal district court held that only a
minimal nexus between the defendant generator and the site was re-
quired. The court stated a sufficient nexus is established where it is
proved "that a defendant's waste was disposed of at a site and that
the substances that make the defendant's waste hazardous are also
present at the site."59 The court emphasized that the release of a
hazardous substance "which results in the incurrence of response
costs and liability need only be of 'a' hazardous substance and not
necessarily one contained in the defendant's waste." 60
In addition, a "possessor or owner" under section 107(a)(3) need
not be a generator. In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chemical Co. ,61 a corporate vice president, who was also the plant su-
pervisor, was held personally liable because he arranged for the dis-
posal of hazardous substances on behalf of the company. 62
Possession of a hazardous substance is equated with control over the
substance, and a person need not own, see or touch the substance to
be liable.63 Northeastern Pharmaceutical and the other cases demon-
(former mortgagee who purchased property at foreclosure sale and assigned it four
months later was exempt from liability).
53. 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988).
54. Id. at 1573.
55. Id.
56. 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989).
57. Id. at 169.
58. 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
59. Id. at 1332-33.
60. Id. at 1333 (emphasis in original); see also United States v. South Carolina
Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 992 (D.S.C. 1984) (under CERCIA, the
government need not "prove that hazardous substances traceable to each generator
were released"), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub norn. United States v. Monsanto Co.,
858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989).
61. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
62. Id. at 744. After summarily rejecting the defense of the corporate shield and
dismissing the necessity of "piercing the corporate veil," the court held that the na-
ture of the liability was personal, rather than derivative, even though the officer acted
on behalf of the company. Id.
63. Id. at 743. The corporate officer had control of the hazardous substances
because he "actually knew about, had immediate supervision over, and was directly
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strate the great extent of liability imposed on private parties by
CERCLA.
Both the federal and local governments are also liable for cleanup
costs under CERCLA. In Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle
County,64 a political subdivision of Delaware was found liable for re-
sponse costs under section 107.65 CERCLA was interpreted as pre-
empting any state law tort immunity provided to the county. Also,
CERCLA's definition of person was found to clearly encompass local
governments. 66
Section 120 of CERCLA also holds every department, agency and
instrumentality of the United States subject to compliance with CER-
CLA.67 The federal government is subject to liability under section
107 in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovern-
mental entity.68
In deciding Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,69 the United States
Supreme Court expanded the already large category of potentially
responsible parties to include state governments. Like the federal
and local governments, states may now be sued for damages by pri-
vate parties in federal court under section 107.
II. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
Beginning with Hans v. Louisiana 7o in 1890, the Supreme Court has
struggled over the meaning of the eleventh amendment.T1 Notwith-
responsible.., for the transportation and disposal of the.., plant's hazardous sub-
stances...." Id.
64. 605 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Del. 1985).
65. Id. at 1354.
66. Id. The county argued that Congress enacted specific provisions to override
the federal government's immunity from suit. Since similar provisions were not en-
acted for state and local governments, immunity was not overridden. The court re-
jected this argument and chose to read the federal immunity abrogation provision as
an amplification of CERCLA's definition of "person." Id. at 1355. Under CERCLA,
"person" is defined to mean "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partner-
ship, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State,
municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42
U.S.C. § 9601(21) (Supp. V 1987).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
68. Id. Of the 1,219 final and proposed sites on the NPL, 117 are federal facili-
ties. 54 Fed. Reg. 43,778 (1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300, app. B) (pro-
posed Oct. 26, 1989).
69. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
70. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
71. See id. at 15 (if the proposed eleventh amendment had allowed citizens to sue
their own states, it would never have been adopted); see also Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U.S. 313, 321 (1934) (absent consent, states may not sue each other even though
such suits are within the bounds of article III jurisdiction and are not prohibited by
the eleventh amendment). See generally Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh
Amendment, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1342 (1989) (discusses the diversity theory and con-
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standing the plain words of the amendment, it is generally inter-
preted to provide that states may not be sued by one of their own
citizens in federal court.72
The clutter of eleventh amendment jurisprudence results from the
difficulty of an analysis that must proceed on several levels. First,
federalism creates a tension between the federal and state govern-
ments the Court must balance. 73 Second, separation of powers in-
volves the conflict between Congress' ability to regulate an area and
the corresponding ability of the judiciary to adjudicate it.74 Finally,
the Court struggles over whether the Constitution means what it
says, or whether the meaning expands with the spirit of the text. 75
Legal fictions have only added to the confusion. 76
gressional abrogation theories advanced by various justices and concludes that the
best evidence of what was intended by the framers of the eleventh amendment is the
plain language itself).
72. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 14-16.
73. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2287 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (expansion of state immunity under eleventh amendment is based not on
the amendment, but on prudential concerns for federalism).
74. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 190 (1964) (states are liable under
FELA, in part, because otherwise the Act would give employees a remedy without an
effective means of enforcement), overruled in part, Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways
& Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (plurality decision).
75. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 289 (1985) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (neither the original Constitution, nor the eleventh amendment
established a principle of sovereign immunity as a limit on the federal judicial
power); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (a literal application of arti-
cle III and the eleventh amendment is inappropriate because "[b]ehind the words of
the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control").
76. In Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Court developed the fiction that
a suit against a state officer for enforcing an unconstitutional state law was not a suit
against the state. Id. at 159. The Court reasoned that because the state official acted
illegally in violation of the Constitution, the official was stripped of his official repre-
sentative character and was "subjected in his person to the consequences of his indi-
vidual conduct." Id. at 159-60.
The Court confounded this fiction in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
In Edelman, the Court held that the eleventh amendment barred retroactive relief for
past violations of federal regulations under a federal-state aid program. Id. at 678.
The Court distinguished Young, reasoning that the award in this case would be a form
of compensation, paid out of state funds and "in practical effect [was] indistinguish-
able in many aspects from an award of damages against the State." Id. at 668. The
Court later held in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), that a federal court could
issue an order requiring state officials to send an explanatory notice to plaintiffs ad-
vising them of state administrative procedures for recovering welfare benefits. Id. at
347-48.
In Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985), the Court distinguished Quern stating
that the notice relief in that case did not bind state officials in any way because it was
ancillary to the injunctive prospective relief allowed in Quern. Id. at 71. Petitioners in
Green were seeking an injunction, a declaratory judgment and notice relief, claiming
that the method of calculating earned income to determine benefits under the Fed-
eral Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program used by the Michi-
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The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 77
The amendment was enacted to limit the federal judicial power
granted under article 111.78 Article III describes the jurisdiction of
the federal judicial power and, in pertinent part, provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
... to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State
and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States
•.. and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.
79
In Chisholm v. Georgia,8 0 the Court held that the state-citizen diversity
clause of article III gave the Court jurisdiction to hear a suit by a
citizen of South Carolina against the state of Georgia.81 The Court
awarded a damage judgment against Georgia, allowing the South
Carolina citizen to recover on a revolutionary war debt.82
States were alarmed by the Chisholm decision. Most states had in-
curred large debts during the Revolutionary War, and feared suits
similar to Chisholm.83 The decision prompted swift enactment of the
gan Director of Social Services violated federal law. Id. at 66. While the claim was
pending, Congress amended the statute rendering the claims moot. See id. The
Court proceeded anyway and determined that the eleventh amendment barred notice
relief because it can only be awarded as an ancillary form of relief to an injunction.
Since there was "no continuing violation of federal law to enjoin," notice relief was
unavailable. Id. at 71. The Court also denied a declaratory judgment for allegedly
unlawful past actions of the state because the judgment could be used as res judicata
in state court and would then serve to operate as a damage award against the state-a
result barred by the eleventh amendment. Id. at 73.
In Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), the Court
limited Young to violations of federal law. The Court held that it need not decide
eleventh amendment issues "when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has violated
state law." Id. at 106 (emphasis in original). Reasoning that Young protected the fed-
eral interest, the Court stated that "[a] federal court's grant of relief against state
officials on the basis of state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindi-
cate the supreme authority of federal law." Id.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
78. See Tribe, supra note 7, at 684.
79. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
80. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
81. Id. at 450-51.
82. Id. at 479-80.
83. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821) (states originally
objected to the adoption of the Constitution because of their great indebtedness and
fear that these debts might be prosecuted in federal courts).
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eleventh amendment, thereby overruling Chisholm.84 By ratifying the
eleventh amendment, the states were protected from suit by citizens
of other states.8 5 While the amendment only prohibits suits against
a state by citizens of another state, or by citizens of a foreign state,
the Supreme Court has expanded the jurisdictional prohibition to
bar suits against a state by the state's own citizens, and to bar suits
against a state by a foreign state.
Although not expressly forbidden by the eleventh amendment, the
Court held in Hans v. Louisiana86 "that a Louisiana citizen could not
sue Louisiana in federal court for failing to pay off state bonds in
violation of the federal contracts clause."87 In so deciding, the
Court established the judicial doctrine of sovereign immunity which
is "exemplified"88 in the eleventh amendment.89
If the Hans Court had not extended immunity to Louisiana, in-
state citizens would have been able to sue under the article III "aris-
ing under" jurisdictional clause, while such suits by out-of-state resi-
dents would be barred by the eleventh amendment. 90 Such a literal
reading of the eleventh amendment would have the absurd result of
treating in-state and out-of-state residents differently.91 Therefore,
the Court concluded that a comprehensive sovereign immunity was
84. See Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1058-59.
85. One commentator reads the eleventh amendment as a method used to nar-
row the affirmative grant of citizen-state jurisdiction in article III, rather than a
method to prohibit federal courts from exercising jurisdiction in such cases. See id. at
1038. The argument of this "diversity theory" is that federal question jurisdiction
may be exercised where a state is sued by a citizen of another state, even though the
language of the eleventh amendment apparently prohibits it. Id.
86. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
87. Fletcher, supra note 5, at 1039; see Hans, 134 U.S. at 21.
88. See Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921). "[T]he Constitution does not
embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State with-
out consent given[;] . . . not even one brought by its own citizens, because of the
fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Id. at 497.
89. The Court did not want a repeat of Chisholm. Consequently, it used a histori-
cal approach to extend the eleventh amendment's jurisdictional bar. The Court
stated, " 'It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent.... Unless ... there is a surrender of this immunity in
the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States, and the danger intimated
must be merely ideal.'" Hans, 134 U.S. at 13 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A.
Hamilton)) (emphasis in original).
Another historical approach is that article III never removed state sovereign im-
munity, and that the eleventh amendment simply restores the original understanding
of article III. See Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. CoLo. L. REV.
139, 144 (1977). It is ironic that the same language from THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A.
Hamilton), used to establish judicial sovereign immunity in Hans, is invoked in Union
Gas as one rationale for revoking a state's immunity under the plenary power of the
commerce clause. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2284 (1989).
90. See Marshall, supra note 71, at 1352.
91. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
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an understood element of the eleventh amendment.92
State sovereign immunity was expanded even further in Monaco v.
Mississippi.93 In Monaco, the Court held that Mississippi could not be
sued by Monaco, a principality of Paris, France. Monaco sought to
recover payment on a state bond issued by Mississippi in 1883.94
Monaco emphasized that neither the positive grants of jurisdiction
under article III, nor the literal restrictions of the eleventh amend-
ment completely define when a state can be sued.95 The Court
stated: "Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postu-
lates which limit and control."96 In Monaco, the postulate was that
states retained their sovereignty unless they consented to suit.97
Monaco recognized that in certain cases, states surrendered their
immunity " 'in the plan of the convention.' "98 Disputes between
two states, or between the United States and a state are within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because the defendant state has
consented in the plan of the convention.99 The Court reasoned that
the constitutional plan provided the means for judicial settlement of
certain cases in order to maintain the union.100 However, the Court
reasoned that since a foreign state lies outside the union, federalist
concerns did not apply, and no surrender of immunity could be in-
ferred in favor of a foreign state.' 0 '
Both in Hans and Monaco the Court declared that states could con-
sent to suit in federal court.' 02 Both cases also concluded that con-
sent was necessary unless a state had already surrendered immunity in
the plan of the convention.o5
In Parden v. Terminal Railway,104 the Court confounded the consent
theory by holding that a waiver could be implied from the conduct of
92. Id. at 16.
93. 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
94. Id. at 330.
95. See id. at 321.
96. Id. at 322.
97. Id. 322-23.
98. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton)).
99. Id. at 328-29.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 330.
102. Id. at 322-23 (stating that the requirement of consent to be sued is necessar-
ily implied in the eleventh amendment); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20 (1890)
(states cannot be made the subject ofjudicial cognizance unless the state consents to
be sued or initiates the action).
103. The Court in both cases supported this conclusion by referring to THE FED-
ERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton). Monaco, 292 U.S. at 324; Hans, 134 U.S. at 13. For the
portion of the text referred to by the Court in each case, see supra note 89.
104. 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled in part, Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways &
Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (plurality decision).
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a state. 105 The Court held that Alabama entered interstate com-
merce by operating a railroad and consequently waived its immunity
under the eleventh amendment.106 The state thereby consented to a
suit by an injured employee who sought damages under the Federal
Employers Liability Act (FELA).107
Parden also addressed the ability of Congress to override state sov-
ereignty when legislating pursuant to the commerce clause.1O$ The
Court stated in Parden that by empowering Congress to regulate
commerce, the state surrendered their immunity from liability under
FELA.109 However, the Court concluded that recognition of this
congressional power alone was not enough to override immunity,
rendering the assertion dicta.110 The Court held that a state must
still consent to jurisdiction, in addition to any surrender of immunity
in the constitutional plan. " I I
Parden could be construed as holding that immunity is abrogated
where Congress legislates pursuant to the commerce clause, but it is
commonly understood to represent the implied waiver theory of con-
sent." 2 One of the major factors controlling the decision in Parden
was state accountability. Underlying the theories of congressional
abrogation and implied waiver was the fact that if the injured plaintiff
was not allowed to sue the state, FELA's remedies were meaning-
less.113 The necessity of upholding comprehensive federal regula-
tions outweighed state sovereign immunity, although only
temporarily. 1 14
The Court distinguished the Parden implied waiver theory of con-
sent in Employees of the Department of Public Health and Welfare v. Depart-
105. Parden, 377 U.S. at 192.
106. Id. at 196-97.
107. Id. at 192.
108. See id. at 191.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 192.
111. Id. This assertion by the Court is contrary to the historical analysis of Monaco
and Hans, which required either state consent, or a surrender of immunity in the plan
of the convention, but not both. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
112. See Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 282 (1973) (Parden analysis turned on the issue of
waiver). The plurality opinion in Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp.,
483 U.S. 468 (1987), expressly overruled the implication in Parden that consent could
be inferred solely from the fact that states had empowered Congress to regulate com-
merce through ratification of the Constitution. Id. at 478.
113. If the plaintiff was not allowed to sue the state, there would be no means by
which liability could be enforced. Parden, 377 U.S. at 197. The Court reasoned that
states were entering spheres normally occupied by private parties and corporations.
As a result, allowing them to escape regulation "would bear the seeds of a substantial
impediment to the efficient working of our federalism." Id. at 197.
114. Id. at 196.
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ment of Public Health and Welfare. 1 15 In Employees, employees of a
Missouri state mental hospital sued the state under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) for overtime compensation, liquidated dam-
ages, and attorney's fees.'16 The Court found that the FLSA defini-
tion of employer explicitly included state-run mental hospitals." 7
However, the Court reasoned that state hospitals were not for profit
and not proprietary like the railroad run by Alabama in Parden."18
The Court concluded that neither the inclusion of state hospitals in
the definition of employer, nor the inference that commerce clause
power swept away the state's immunity, was enough to impose liabil-
ity under FLSA."I9
Unlike the Parden analysis, state accountability was one factor that
prevented the Court in Employees from imposing state liability.120 A
holding for the plaintiff would mean that a myriad of state govern-
ment employees could sue the state.' 2 ' These suits would, in effect,
impose a pervasive scheme of federal regulation directly affecting
state treasuries.' 2 2 The Court refused to reach such a result without
clear language from Congress that state immunity had been
abrogated. 123
The clear language rule was reaffirmed in Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon,'21 where the Court enunciated that "Congress may abrogate
the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal
court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language
of the statute."1 25 The handicapped respondent in Atascadero
claimed that the state discriminated against him by denying him em-
ployment at a state hospital.126 The Court found no clear statement
in the federal Rehabilitation Act removing state immunity and de-
115. 411 U.S. 279, 296 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[T]he concept cannot
be stretched sufficiently further to encompass this case.").
116. Id. at 281.
117. Id. at 283.
118. Id. at 284.
119. Id. at 285.
120. The Court pointed out that Parden involved a rather isolated state activity,
while the activity involved in Employees pervasively affected the hierarchy of a state
government. Id.
121. Id. "We deal here with problems that may well implicate elevator operators,
janitors, charwomen, security guards, secretaries, and the like, in every office build-
ing in a state's governmental hierarchy." Id.
122. Id. at 284-85.
123. Id. at 285. From a policy standpoint it is important to note that unlike the
plaintiff in Parden, the plaintiffs in Employees could still get relief by having the Secre-
tary of Labor bring an action against the state. Id. at 285-86. Sovereign immunity
does not prohibit suits against the states by the United States. See United States v.
Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965).
124. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
125. Id. at 242.
126. Id. at 236.
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nied relief.127 Expressing concern for the balance of powers, the
Court in Atascadero reasoned it should not take an expansive view of
its own jurisdiction unless the "clearest indications" existed that
Congress had expanded the Court's power.128
In Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation,129
the Court declined an invitation to overrule Hans, and instead reaf-
firmed eleventh amendment sovereign immunity.130 A plurality of
the Court partially overruled Parden.'3a The Court stated that abro-
gation of sovereign immunity could not be inferred solely from Con-
gress' powers under the commerce clause, an assertion made by the
Parden Court in dicta.' 3 2 The Welch Court reiterated that Congress
must express in unmistakably clear language that immunity is
overruled. '33
The test of unmistakable clarity required by Employees, Atascadero,
and Welch, allows the Court to implicitly balance state interests
against sweeping congressional power to regulate states under the
commerce clause.13 4 In contrast, Congress' power to abrogate state
immunity under the fourteenth amendment is not subject to a clear
statement test by the Court.
127. Id. at 247. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides that qualified handi-
capped individuals will not be excluded from, denied benefits in, or be discriminated
against under any program receiving federal assistance. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
128. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243. This is so even though it is the duty of the Court
"'to say what the law is.'" Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803)).
One commentator uses Marbury's principles to attack the congressional abroga-
tion theory of sovereign immunity. See Marshall, supra note 71, at 1348. The con-
gressional abrogation theory asserts that since the eleventh amendment restricts only
the "judicial power," it does not by itself restrict Congress' authority to expand the
jurisdiction of the Court. Marshall argues that Marbuty does restrict Congress' ability
to expand the Court's jurisdiction. Id. This conclusion follows from the fact that the
Judiciary Act of 1789 struck down by the Court in Marbury was an explicit expansion
by Congress of a constitutionally limited grant of original jurisdiction in article III,
§ 2, cl. 2. Id.
In his concurrence in Union Gas, Justice Stevens draws the clear distinction be-
tween congressional abrogation of judicially created sovereign immunity, and con-
gressional abrogation of sovereign immunity constraints explicit in the eleventh
amendment. He makes it clear that the former is permissible under Marbury, whereas
the latter is not. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2286 (1989) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). Congress may never overrule a constitutional provision. Id.
129. 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
130. See id. at 495-96 (Scalia, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 478.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Baker, supra note 89, at 187 ("a balancing of state and national interests
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In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,' 35 eleventh amendment sovereign immunity
bowed to Congress' plenary power to legislate as a means of enforc-
ing the substantive guarantees of the fourteenth amendment.' 3 6
The Court based its decision in Fitzpatrick on the fact that the four-
teen amendment was specifically designed to limit state authority. 37
The Court held that the eleventh amendment did not bar citizens
of Connecticut from suing their state to recover a back pay award
withheld due to sex discrimination in a retirement benefits plan.' 3 8
The suit was brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.' 3 9
Since the definition of "person" under Title VII includes govern-
ments, governmental agencies, and political subdivisions, 40 the
Court found that Congress intended to bring states within the pur-
view of the statute.' 4 ' The Court in Fitzpatrick did not require Con-
gress to demonstrate an unmistakable clarity to override state
immunity, as it had previously required in commerce clause cases.' 42
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,143 the Court relied on Fitzpatrick
and drew an analogy between Congress' plenary authority under the
article I commerce clause and Congress' plenary authority under the
fourteenth amendment. The Court then found the clear intent nec-
essary to override state immunity, and thereby rendered states liable
to suit in federal court under CERCLA.
III. PENNSYLVANIA V UNION GAS Co.
In Union Gas, predecessors of Union Gas had operated a coal gas-
ification plant near Brodhead Creek in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania,
135. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
136. Id. at 448.
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The section provides that "[tihe Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
Id. The amendment was one of three ratified after the Civil War and its provisions
clearly limit state authority while granting Congress power to enforce such limita-
tions. This shift in the balance of federalism was aptly described in Ex Parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339 (1879). "[E]very addition of power to the general government involves
a corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the States. It is carved
out of them." Id. at 346.
138. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 457.
139. Id. at 447-48. Title VII was enacted pursuant to section five of the four-
teenth amendment for the purpose of eliminating discrimination and ensuring equal
protection of the laws.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1982).
141. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448-49.
142. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478
(1987) (must have "unequivocal expression" that immunity is overridden); Atas-
cadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (intent to override immunity
must be unmistakably clear in the language of the statute).
143. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989)..
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for about fifty years.' 44 Several years after the plant closed, the state
acquired easements and performed excavations to control flooding
along the creek. While excavating the state struck a large deposit of
coal tar, causing the tar to begin "to seep into the creek."145 The
EPA "determined that the tar was a hazardous substance and de-
clared the site the nation's first emergency Superfund site."146 Both
the state and federal government cleaned up the site, with the federal
government reimbursing the state $720,000 for cleanup costs.' 4 7
The United States sued Union Gas under sections 104 and 106 of
CERCLA. In response, "Union Gas filed a third-party complaint
against Pennsylvania, asserting that the State was responsible for at
least a portion of the costs because it was an 'owner or operator' of
the hazardous-waste site . . "148 The district court dismissed the
complaint finding a suit against the state was barred by the eleventh
amendment.' 4 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed, "finding no clear expression of congressional intent
to hold States liable in monetary damages under CERCLA."150 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, and while the case was pending,
Congress amended CERCLA by passing the SARA amendments.151
As a result, the Court vacated the decision of the Third Circuit and
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the SARA amend-
ments.' 5 2 On remand, the Third Circuit held that states were liable
for damages under CERCLA, the eleventh amendment not barring
suit. 153
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that CERCLA, as amended by
SARA, expresses a clear intent to hold states liable for damages in
federal court. 154 The Court also held that Congress was acting
144. Id. at 2276.
145. Id.
146. Id. (The plant had been dismantled about 1950.).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2277. Union Gas also claimed in its third party complaint that the state
was responsible "because its flood-control efforts had negligently caused or contrib-
uted to the release of the coal tar into the creek." Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. See generally Note, Congressional Abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment-States
Are Not Subject to Suits in Federal Court Brought by Private Parties Pursuant to the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 32 VILL. L. REV. 769 (1987)
(analysis of case below criticizing the Third Circuit Court of Appeal's mechanical
application of the Employees and Atascadero rules).
151. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2277.
152. Id.
153. United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1357 (3d Cir. 1987), aff'd sub
norn. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
154. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2280. The case was a plurality decision. Justice
Scalia wrote a separate opinion concurring on the issue of congressional intent, but
dissenting from the holding of the plurality on Congress' ability to abrogate the im-
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within its authority "when legislating pursuant to the Commerce
Clause" to hold states so liable.' 55
Justice Brennan used a five-part analysis of four different sections
of the statute to hold that CERCLA, as amended by SARA, shows an
unmistakably clear intent to hold states liable. First, " '[s]tates' are
explicitly included within the statute's definition of 'persons.' "156
The liability provision of the statute applies to "owners or opera-
tors" and "persons." 157 An "owner or operator" "is defined by ref-
erence to certain activities that a 'person' may undertake." 5 8
munity of states under the commerce clause. Id. at 2295, 2303 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part, and dissenting in part).
155. Id. at 2286. On this portion of the plurality decision, Justice Stevens wrote a
concurrence to clarify his opinion that Congress could only abrogate the judicially
created eleventh amendment immunity represented in Hans. Id. (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). Justice Stevens stressed that Congress could never use its powers under the
commerce clause to expand the Court's jurisdiction in violation of the plain language
of the eleventh amendment, because "[a] statute cannot amend the Constitution."
Id. Justice White also wrote a separate concurrence agreeing that Congress can abro-
gate a state's immunity, but disagreeing withJustice Brennan's reasoning. Id. at 2289
(White, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 2277 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (current
version in Supp. V 1987)). See supra note 66 for the statutory definition of "person."
157. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2277 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986) (current version in Supp. V 1987)). Specifically, the statute provides for the
liability of the following persons:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were dis-
posed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for dis-
posal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such
person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel
owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazard-
ous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites se-
lected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release
which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance,
shall be liable ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1987) (emphasis added).
158. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2277 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986) (current version in Supp. V 1987)). With an exception for persons merely
holding security interests, the statute defines an "owner or operator" to include:
(i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by
demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facil-
ity, any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any
facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclo-
sure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or
local government, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise con-
trolled activities at such facility immediately beforehand.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
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Hence, a state would be liable in any circumstance in which it were
an owner or operator, as long as not expressly excluded.159
Second, the SARA amendments included section 101(20)(D), a
new provision excluding states from liability when they have ac-
quired ownership or control of property involuntarily.160 However,
the exclusion is limited and does not apply if a state " 'has caused or
contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance from the facility.' "161 In such a case, a state is subject to lia-
bility under section 107 in the same manner, and to the same extent,
as other parties.162 The Court reasoned that it would be unneces-
sary to exclude a state from liability unless Congress intended to
hold states liable in the first place.163
Third, the Court compared the exclusion language of section
101(20)(D) to the language of section 120(a)(1) which waives the
federal government's immunity from damage suits under CER-
CLA.164 Finding the language identical, the Court concluded that
section 101(20)(D) was one indication that Congress "intended to
override the States' immunity from suit."165
Fourth, the Court looked to another exclusion provision, section
107(d)(2), which exempts states from liability for responding to an
emergency at a facility owned by another personA66 However, sec-
159. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2278.
160. Id. at 2277 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (current
version in Supp. V 1987)). Specifically, the statute provides that "[t]he term 'owner
or operator' does not include a unit of State or local government which acquired
ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandon-
ment, or other circumstances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by
virtue of its function as sovereign." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (Supp. V 1987).
161. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2277-78 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D)).
162. Id. at 2278.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2279. Section 120(a)(l) provides:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States (includ-
ing the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government) shall be
subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the same manner and to the
same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental
entity, including liability under section 9607 of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
165. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2279.
166. Id. at 2278 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (current
version in Supp. V 1987)). Section 9607(d)(2) provides:
No State or local government shall be liable under this subchapter for
costs or damages as a result of actions taken in response to an emergency
created by the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance gener-
ated by or from a facility owned by another person. This paragraph shall
not preclude liability for costs or damages as a result of gross negligence or
intentional misconduct by the State or local government. For the purpose
of the preceding sentence, reckless, willful, or wanton misconduct shall con-
stitute gross negligence.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
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tion 107(d)(2) does impose liability on a state in emergency situa-
tions if damages are the result of the state's gross negligence or
intentional misconduct.' 67 The Court saw this exclusion to the ex-
clusion as "an explicit recognition of the potential liability of States
under this statute." 68
Fifth, the Court turned to the citizen suit provision of the statute
which provides that suits may be brought against a state only " 'to
the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment.' "169 The Court
discerned from this provision that "reservation of States' rights
under the Eleventh Amendment would be unnecessary if Congress
had not elsewhere in the statute overridden the States' immunity
from suit."' 1
70
Collectively, the Court held that the language of the statute
"clearly evinces an intent to hold States liable in damages in federal
court."'17 The Court then determined that Congress had not ex-
ceeded its powers under the Constitution by holding states liable
under CERCLA because the plenary authority of the commerce
clause grants Congress the power to override state immunity.17 2
In Union Gas, support for the congressional abrogation theory is
drawn first from dicta in the Parden and Employees decisions.173 Both
cases stated, without so holding, that states surrendered a portion of
their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to regulate
commerce.' 74 As a result, the Court stated in Union Gas that "our
decisions mark a trail unmistakably leading to the conclusion that
Congress may permit suits against the States for money
damages."1 75
The Court in Union Gas drew additional support from decisions of
the United States Court of Appeals addressing the issue.176 In all,
167. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2278; see supra note 166.
168. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2278.
169. Id. at 2278-79 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (cur-
rent version in Supp. V 1987)). Section 9659(a)(1) provides, with certain exceptions,
that:
any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including the United States and any other gov-
ernmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the elev-
enth amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of any
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order which has become
effective pursuant to this chapter ....
42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
170. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2279.
171. Id. at 2280.
172. Id. at 2286.
173. See id. at 2281.
174. See supra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
175. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2281.
176. See id. Specifically, the Court stated that "[it is no accident ... that every
Court of Appeals to have reached this issue has concluded that Congress has the
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five circuits had previously reached the conclusion that Congress has
the authority to override states' immunity when legislating under
plenary grants of authority.' 7 7  The Court also relied on Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer,17S drawing an analogy between the plenary grant of author-
ity in section five of the fourteenth amendment, and the plenary
grant of authority under the commerce clause.179
In Fitzpatrick, the abrogation of state immunity was based on the
fourteenth amendment which, unlike the commerce clause, was en-
acted to limit state authority.t80 However, the Court in Union Gas
emphasized that both grants expand federal power and contract state
power in the same manner.' 8 ' A plenary grant of authority is abso-
lute and unqualified,182 so the Court refused to view the grant of
authority under the fourteenth amendment as somehow
"ultraplenary." 183
In order to find congressional abrogation of state immunity under
CERCLA constitutional, the Court had to meet the additional re-
quirement that the state had somehow consented to suit. The Court
did so by reasoning that states had consented to suit through ratifica-
tion of the Constitution containing the commerce clause.184 In do-
ing so, states gave Congress authority to regulate commerce, and to
render them liable for damages in federal court. The analysis of the
Union Gas Court is a return to the theories enunciated in Monaco and
authority to abrogate States' immunity from suit when legislating pursuant to the
plenary powers granted it by the Constitution." Id.
177. See United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1357 (3d Cir. 1987) (suffi-
cient evidence in the SARA amendments to manifest Congress' intent to abrogate
sovereign immunity under the commerce clause), aff'd sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989); In re McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311, 327-28
(7th Cir. 1987) (Congress has power to create a damages action against states in
federal court pursuant to its plenary power under the commerce clause to regulate
bankruptcies), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 895 (1987); County of Monroe v. Florida, 678
F.2d 1124, 1133 (2d Cir. 1982) (sovereign immunity overridden by Federal Extradi-
tion Act enacted by Congress pursuant to plenary powers granted under article IV),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104 (1983); Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070,
1081 (5th Cir. 1979) (Veterans Reemployment Rights Act, passed pursuant to the
article I war power of Congress, is not barred by the eleventh amendment); Mills
Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 1979) (language used by Con-
gress acting under copyright and patent clause demonstrates clear intent to override
state sovereign immunity).
178. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
179. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2282.
180. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 448 (1976); see supra notes 135-42 and
accompanying text.
181. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2282.
182. "Plenary" is defined as: "full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, unquali-
fied." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1038 (5th ed. 1979).
183. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2282.
184. Id. at 2284.
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Hans. 18 5
The Court stressed the often preemptive nature of the commerce
clause power on state authority to regulate.186 If states are prohib-
ited from regulating in certain areas, then precluding congressional
action would leave those areas unregulated.187 Environmental regu-
lation under CERCLA squarely presented this problem. If Congress
was precluded from creating a federal damages action against states
by private parties, states would escape liability for damages owed to
private parties.188 Essentially, CERCLA would give private parties
the right to recover cleanup costs without any cause of action to ob-
tain the remedy.
The Court reasoned that forcing states to pay damages to private
parties would meet two of the important goals of CERCLA.189 First,
CERCLA was intended to hold "everyone" who is responsible for haz-
ardous waste contamination liable for cleanup costs.' 90 Including
states as parties merely carried out CERCLA's comprehensive
scheme.
Second, CERCLA encourages voluntary cleanups by allowing pri-
vate parties to recover cleanup costs under the liability provisions. 191
Every voluntary cleanup preserves limited Superfund dollars.192 Al-
lowing private parties to sue states for cleanup costs makes it more
likely that private parties will perform voluntary cleanups at state fa-
cilities. Because state facilities comprise a significant class of owners
and operators, the Court concluded that a private damages action
against the states was necessary. 193
Union Gas provided a clear opportunity for the Court to establish a
theory of congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity.
However, Justice Stevens made it clear in his concurring opinion that
Congress' plenary power to subject states to suit in federal court
only applies to override judicially created sovereign immunity.194
185. The Court cites Monaco for the proposition that consent by states to congres-
sional authority under the Constitution was a surrender of immunity in the plan of
the convention. Id.; see supra note 114 and accompanying text.
186. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2284. Preemption displaces state authority even
where Congress has not acted.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 2285.
190. Id. (emphasis in original).
191. Id. Section 104(a) gives EPA authority to use Superfund dollars to cleanup a
facility, but also allows an owner/operator or other responsible party to undertake
the response action. Private parties may then recover costs under section 107. See
supra note 29 and accompanying text.
192. See Lyons, supra note 49, at 281 & n.41 (EPA estimates cost to clean up NPL
sites for the federal government will be between $11.7 to $22.7 billion).
193. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2285.
194. Id. at 2286 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Justice Stevens emphasized that Congress cannot override the sover-
eign immunity explicitly provided for in the eleventh amendment be-
cause "[a] statute cannot amend the Constitution."195
Justice White disagreed with the plurality conclusion that CER-
CLA expresses an unmistakably clear intent to hold states liable for
damages in federal court. 196 Justice White examined the language of
CERCLA and SARA separately and concluded that neither congres-
sional enactment contained the requisite clear language to abrogate
state immunity. 197
Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality that Congress intended to
hold states liable under CERCLA.198 He attacked Justice White's
method of statutory analysis, emphasizing that CERCLA and SARA
must be examined as a whole, rather than by attempting "to plumb
the intent of the particular Congress that enacted a particular
provision." 199
Justice Scalia disagreed with the plurality, however, on the issue of
congressional power to override state sovereign immunity. Justice
Scalia concluded that preserving Hans, while allowing Congress to
overrule the sovereign immunity created by it, "achieves the worst of
both worlds." 200 Justice Scalia found that the plurality's holding did
not resolve the complexities of eleventh amendment jurisprudence,
nor did it preserve sovereign immunity as a fundamental principle of
federalism. 20'
Justice Scalia characterized the plurality's reliance on Fitzpatrick as
error. He pointed out the temporal difference between the four-
teenth amendment, enacted after the eleventh amendment, and arti-
cle I powers which remain subject to sovereign immunity under the
eleventh amendment.202 Justice Scalia emphasized that the four-
teenth amendment's substantive 'provisions were intended to limit
state authority and thereby permit abrogation of sovereign immu-
195. Id.
196. See id. at 2289 (White, J., concurring). Justice White agreed with the majority
that Congress may abrogate state immunity under commerce clause, but did not con-
cur with the reasoning of the majority. Id.
197. Id. at 2289-94.
198. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
199. Id. at 2295-96. Instead, Justice Scalia stated:
It is our task, as I see it, not to enter the minds of the Members of Con-
gress-who need have nothing in mind in order for their votes to be both
lawful and effective-but rather to give fair and reasonable meaning to the
text of the United States Code, adopted by various Congresses at various
times.
Id. at 2296.
200. Id. at 2299.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 2302.
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nity.20s Justice Scalia rejected the analogy being drawn between the
fourteenth amendment and the commerce clause because the result
is an expansion of Congress' power to override immunity to the ex-
tent of all of Congress' article I powers-powers so broad they would
render immunity "a practical nullity." 204 He stated that a constitu-
tional interpretation that allows article III powers to be overcome by
exercising article I powers is "too much at war with itself to
endure."20 5
IV. ANALYSIS
Union Gas is significant for eleventh amendment jurisprudence be-
cause it allows for substantial alteration of the judicial doctrine of
state sovereign immunity as originally established under Hans v. Lou-
isiana.20 6 Under Union Gas, Congress now has clear authority to ab-
rogate judicially created sovereign immunity under its article I power
to regulate commerce. Because congressional power to legislate
under the commerce clause has grown considerably since the time of
Hans, Union Gas has opened up a potentially vast area of state
liability.207
After Union Gas, the test applied by future courts will be whether
Congress has expressed a clear intent to override state immunity,
and whether Congress is legislating pursuant to one of its plenary
powers. 2 08 However, because the test involves ascertaining the in-
tent of Congress, courts will be able to continue to implicitly balance
state and national interests to determine when to abrogate state im-
munity.209 The degree of state liability, and the availability of a rem-
edy, will remain important policy considerations in this implicit
balancing test.210
The plurality in Union Gas applied a statutory analysis similar to
203. Id.
204. Id. The plurality implicitly endorsed this analysis. See supra note 177.
205. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2303 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
206. 134 U.S. 1 (1890); see supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (a restaurant's
insignificant purchases of food flowing through interstate commerce enough to allow
federal regulation of restaurant under Title II of Civil Rights Act); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1937) (commerce clause gives Congress
constitutional authority to safeguard the rights of employees to organize labor un-
ions, and this authority is not limited only to transactions which affect the flow of
commerce).
208. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2276.
209. See Baker, supra note 89, at 175 (recommending an overt balancing test, and
comparing whether Congress or federal courts are better suited to perform the
balancing).
210. These factors have been persuasive in previous decisions, and are unlikely to
disappear as a result of Union Gas. See supra notes 113, 120.
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that of Employees, yet reached a different result in part because of the
nature of the state liability that would be imposed. Both the FLSA in
Employees, and CERCLA in Union Gas, encompass states in their defi-
nition of person. The Court in Employees refused to infer abrogation
from this alone, or from Congress' authority to regulate under the
commerce clause. 2 11 The possibility of pervasive and staggering
state liability was one reason Employees refused to abrogate state im-
munity. 212 This policy consideration did not prevent abrogation of
immunity in Union Gas. Although the degree of liability of any partic-
ular state under Union Gas may be high, the nature of liability is not
as pervasive as that in Employees.215 Cleanup of a state hazardous
waste dump may be very expensive, but state liability under CER-
CIA will not impose a pervasive scheme of federal environmental
regulation on the state.
Another major difference between Employees and Union Gas was the
issue of whether a remedy was available. In Employees, while an indi-
vidual employee was not allowed to sue the state, the Secretary of
Labor was allowed to do so under the FLSA on behalf of the em-
ployee.2i4 But in Union Gas, if an individual incurring cleanup costs
with respect to a state hazardous waste facility could not sue the state
to recover damages, the individual would have no remedy to recover
the costs.
Future cases involving the ability of an individual to sue a state will
likely turn on whether the Court finds a clear expression of congres-
sional intent to hold states liable.215 If so, the commerce clause, or
perhaps other plenary powers, will allow Congress to override state
immunity.
Whether the test of unmistakable clarity announced by the Court
in Atascadero survives Union Gas is arguable. Union Gas followed a dis-
jointed and far-reaching statutory analysis to find the necessary clar-
ity. 2 16 Courts and commentators agree that CERCLA is poorly
drafted and generally lacks clarity.217 For that reason, the Court in
Union Gas was correct in applying a comprehensive, structural analy-
211. See Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
212. The Court reasoned that imposition of liability on state institutions would
impose a pervasive "new federal scheme of regulation." Id. at 285.
213. Imposition of liability under the Fair Labor Standards Act in Employees could
potentially reach 2.7 million state or local government employees. Id. at 287.
214. Id. at 286.
215. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2277 (1989). If the courts
find no clear intent to override sovereign immunity, they will never reach the consti-
tutional issue of abrogation.
216. See supra notes 157-69 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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sis to find the clear intent necessary to hold states liable.218
While the plurality in Union Gas relied upon five United States
Court of Appeals' decisions to support its finding of congressional
abrogation of immunity under the commerce clause,219 three of
these cases did not base abrogation of sovereign immunity on the
commerce clause. Instead, they were based on other congressional
plenary grants of authority, including extradition powers under arti-
cle IV, the war power under article I, and the copyright and patent
clause. 220 If the Court's reliance on these cases can be considered as
an endorsement of their holdings, the Court appears likely to take an
expansive view of Congress' ability to abrogate state immunity under
any plenary grant of authority in future decisions.
Prior to Union Gas, Congress has legislated under the assumption
of state immunity provided by Hans. 2 2 1 Now, Congress will have to
focus carefully on language subjecting or relieving states from liabil-
ity, or else the courts will be left with the task of interpreting legisla-
tive intent. Under either result, the recognition of the congressional
abrogation theory in Union Gas will make it easier to impose liability
on states.
Union Gas has a significant effect on environmental law because it
allows states to be subjected to liability under CERCLA. The rejec-
tion of absolute state immunity in Union Gas is supported by two pol-
icy considerations. First, subjecting states to liability will add to
Congress' objective of encouraging private party response ac-
tions.222 A private party will be more likely to proceed with a
cleanup at a previously state-owned or state-operated facility when
there is the possibility of recovering cleanup costs from the state.
Second, subjecting states to liability is fair. CERCLA's liability provi-
sions cover the federal government, local governments, and an array
of private parties. States should not receive preferential treatment.
218. There is a movement in the Court to approach detailed, complex statutes as a
whole, deriving congressional intent from the entire structure of the statute. See
United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444 (1988) (determining congressional intent
under the Civil Service Reform Act by examining the purpose, the entirety of the
text, and the structure of review it establishes); Starr, Of Forests and Trees: Structuralism
in the Interpretation of Statutes, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 706 (1988) (describing com-
prehensive approach to complex statutes as structuralism in the interpretive process
and a trend with the Court).
219. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2281 (1989).
220. See County of Monroe v. Florida, 678 F.2d 1124, 1133 (2d Cir. 1982) (extra-
dition power), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104 (1983); Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600
F.2d 1070, 1081 (5th Cir. 1979) (war power); Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d
1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 1979) (copyright and patent clause).
221. This point is raised by Justice Scalia as one reason not to alter the presump-
tion of sovereign immunity as established by Hans. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2298
(Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
222. See supra note 27.
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Environmental harm must be remedied by all responsible parties if
the purpose of CERCLA is to be achieved.
Nevertheless, the degree of state liability may be less than antici-
pated by the Court in Union Gas. One controlling factor in the plu-
rality decision was that states were a significant class of owners and
operators.223 But state-owned facilities actually comprise only a
small percentage of the sites on the National Priorities List (NPL).
Of the 1,219 final and proposed sites on the NPL, only 29 are cur-
rently state-owned.224 Information on facilities previously owned or
operated by states is not available from the EPA. Hence, it is difficult
to estimate the potential degree of state liability.
States should be subject to liability under section 107 to the same
extent as any nongovernmental entity. However, the Court's analy-
sis in Union Gas relied in part on section 101(20)(D) to impose state
liability.2 25 This section excludes states who take property involun-
tarily and provides that "[t]he exclusion provided under this para-
graph shall not apply to any State or local government which has
caused or contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazardous
223. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2285. The Court cites to Respondent's Brief,
which states that "the EPA has estimated that over 16% of all contamination sites on
the National Priorities List are currently owned or controlled by states and local gov-
ernments." Brief for Respondent at 8, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct.
2273 (1989) (No. 87-1241).
224. The 29 sites are: (1) Kellogg-Deering Well Field, Norwalk, Connecticut; (2)
Groveland Wells, Groveland, Massachusetts; (3) Sullivan's Ledge, New Bedford,
Massachusetts; (4) Chemical Control, Elizabeth, New Jersey; (5) Radiation Technol-
ogy, Inc., Rockaway Township, NewJersey; (6) Vineland State School, Vineland, New
Jersey; (7) Brewster Well Field, Putnam County, New York; (8) Hudson River PCBs,
Hudson River, New York; (9) Olean Well Field, Olean, New York; (10) Wide Beach
Development, Brant, New York; (11) Fibers Public Supply Wells, Jobos, Puerto Rico;
(12) Frontera Creek, Rio Abajo, Puerto Rico; (13) Vega Alta Public Supply Wells,
Vega Alta, Puerto Rico; (14) Middletown Air Field, Middletown, Pennsylvania; (15)
Old City of York Landfill, Seven Valleys, Pennsylvania; (16) West Virginia Ordnance,
Point Pleasant, West Virginia; (17) Hipps Road Landfill, Duval County, Florida; (18)
Maxey Flats Nuclear Disposal, Hillsboro, Kentucky; (19) Newport Dump, Newport,
Kentucky; (20) North Carolina State University (Lot 86, Farm Unit #1), Raleigh,
North Carolina; (21) North Hollywood Dump, Memphis, Tennessee; (22) Kerr-Mc-
Gee (Kress Creek), DuPage County, Illinois; (23) Auto Ion Chemicals, Inc.,
Kalamazoo, Michigan; (24) Chem Central, Wyoming Township, Michigan; (25) Uni-
versity of Minnesota, Rosemount Residential Center, Rosemount, Minnesota; (26)
South Valley, Albuquerque, New Mexico; (27) French, Ltd., Crosby, Texas; (28)
Shenandoah Stables, Moscow Mills, Missouri; (29) Ordot Landfill, Guam. EPA NPL
Technical Data Base, Final and Proposed NPL Sites with State As Sole Ownership
(Jan. 1990) (computer printout available from the EPA).
225. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2278 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986) (current version in Supp. V 1987)). The Court's analysis encompassed four
sections of CERCLA, but future plaintiffs will be likely to focus on section 101 (20)(D)
because it contains the most explicit language in regard to state liability.
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substance from the facility. ... "226 Under Shore Realty, current own-
ers or operators are liable without reference to whether they caused
or contributed to a release or threatened release.227 Under Tan-
glewood East Homeowners, previous owners are liable if there was a dis-
posal of hazardous waste at the facility at the time of ownership.228
Because of the Court's reliance on section 101(20)(D), plaintiffs at-
tempting to recover CERCLA damages from states in the future may
have to show the state caused or contributed to the harm, a burden
not required in regard to other parties.
CONCLUSION
Union Gas diminishes the effect of the judicial doctrine of state sov-
ereign immunity established under Hans. Now, where Congress is
legislating pursuant to the commerce clause, and makes it clear that
states will be subject to liability, private parties may recover damages
from the states in federal court. Union Gas also expanded section
107, the liability provision of CERCLA, to correctly include states in
CERCLA's liability scheme. However, the Court in Union Gas was
forced to include states under a section that could make it easier for
states to elude liability.
Union Gas should provide a message to Congress that abrogation
of state sovereign immunity must be made clear in the language of
the statute. State immunity from suit by its own citizens in federal
court is no longer the assumption. Congress must carefully assess
whether state liability is appropriate, and carefully draft language
that will impose liability. If not, the federal courts will be left with
the task of adequately balancing national interests against state sov-
ereignty.
Catherine Goldberg
226. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (Supp. V 1987) (emphasis added).
227. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985); see
also supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
228. Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568,
1572-73 (5th Cir. 1988); see also supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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